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ABSTRACT
This Article explores the historical development of the academic
analysis of corporate law over the past forty years through the
scholarship of one of its most influential commentators, Professor
James D. Cox of the Duke University School of Law. It traces the ways
in which corporate law scholarship changed from the 1970s to the
present, including the rise of economic theory and empirical work in
the study of corporate law. It shows how Professor Cox’s early
scholarship shaped and challenged economic orthodoxy, while his later
work used empirical analysis to help corporate law become a more
dynamic and richer field.
Throughout his career, Professor Cox’s scholarship has focused on
the protection of shareholder rights. He has rebuffed contractarians’
attacks on shareholder protections using a variety of economic,
psychological, and empirical techniques. Professor Cox’s support for
investors has continued in the wake of financial-market crises,
corporate scandals, and the challenges of globalization. He provides an
outstanding example of how a thoughtful academic can influence
theories and market conditions with several decades of valuable
insights.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past forty years, corporate law scholarship has produced
wide-ranging, penetrating, and sophisticated analysis on par with any
field in the legal academy.1 Spurred by the law and economics
revolution of the 1970s—which prompted varied research, expansive in
scale and international in scope2—corporate law scholars have joined
the vanguard of interdisciplinary analysis within the academy.3 Even as
it has pushed corporate law in new directions, this intellectual
revolution has also reinvigorated longstanding questions that
corporate law has yet to satisfactorily resolve, questions made all the
more pressing by the transformation of the corporate economy over
the past forty years: For whom should the corporation be run? Are
those who run the corporation sufficiently accountable? How should
these answers change as our presumptions about the corporate,
economic, and political worlds shift?
This Article examines the development of modern-day corporate
law by examining the career of a remarkable man Professor James D.
Cox whose scholarship over his forty-five years in the academy has had
a profound influence.4 Cox began as a teaching fellow at Boston
University School of Law in 1970 and—after a series of rapid
promotions at other law schools—joined the Duke Law faculty in 1979,
where he has remained. A central figure in the field of corporate law,
Cox’s career illuminates the transformation of the field as intellectual,
economic, political, and technological changes rendered obsolete old
frameworks and demanded new legal responses.
1. For examples of works addressing the changes in corporate law scholarship over the past
four decades, see BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, THE TRAJECTORY OF (CORPORATE LAW) SCHOLARSHIP:
AN INAUGURAL LECTURE GIVEN IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE OCTOBER 2003, at 38–82
(2004); Matthew T. Bodie, The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law: Returning to the
Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1033, 1040–52 (2012); William W. Bratton, Jr., The
New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471,
1498 (1989); Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342,
347, 349–51 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Law & Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future,
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1167, 1172 (1997) (“[T]he rate of intellectual return on relatively
straightforward problems was exceedingly high.”); see also Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study
of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 141–42, 145–47, 158 (2006)
(tracking the emergence of empiricism across the legal academy).
3. See generally Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Events Studies in the Law (pts. 1 & 2),
4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 141 (2002) (providing examples and explaining the emergence of
corporate law empirical studies).
4. For Professor Cox’s biography, see James D. Cox, DUKE LAW, https://law.duke.edu/
fac/cox [https://perma.cc/E89A-GFZL].
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Cox has written on a variety of topics, but a central theme running
through his work has been the protection of shareholders. In the 1980s
and 1990s, he made his mark as a scholar by challenging the
contractarian approach to corporate law, viewing this legal-intellectual
innovation as a threat to the protection of shareholders.5 In the new
millennium, he has continued to support shareholder rights in the face
of new threats as corporate scandals, globalization, and the global
financial crisis posed new problems to traditional means of defending
shareholders.6 Cox’s work has been innovative as well as traditional.
Although he was often skeptical of some new trends, his scholarship
incorporated recent developments in economics, psychology, and later
empirical methods, and he drew attention to overlooked issues of
organizational culture, while still demonstrating the value of more
traditional doctrinal and analytical approaches to legal scholarship. In
so doing, he provided a model for how careful legal scholarship can
address new ideas and situations.
This Article describes the development of corporate law
scholarship from the 1930s to the present and Cox’s influence on it.
Part I explains the transition from Berle and Means’s trust paradigm,
to the rise of contractarianism, to the eventual counterreaction against
contractarianism. It focuses on four of Cox’s articles that responded to
the underlying assumptions and implications of contractarianism. Part
II evaluates the evolution of legal scholarship as the contractarian
battles stalemated. It begins with four of Cox’s pieces in which he
analyzes the importance of accounting standards and the role of
gatekeepers, and then discusses several of his recent empirical legal
studies.
I. FROM BERLE AND MEANS TO JENSEN AND MECKLING
A. Berle and Means and the Trust Paradigm
Modern corporate law scholarship began with Professors Adolf
Berle and Gardiner Means’s seminal book, The Modern Corporation
and Private Property, which identified the central issue of corporate
law as the “separation of ownership and control,” by which the
dispersal of share ownership effectively removed control of the public
corporation from its putative owners, the shareholders, and gave it to

5. See infra Part I.C.
6. See infra Part II.A.
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its managers.7 This development, left unchecked, would have freed
managers from oversight and enabled managerial self-dealing.8
Professor William Bratton explains that the remedy proposed by Berle
and Means for such unfettered managerial power is that there “should
be a pervasive equitable limitation on power granted to corporate
management” under which management’s power could only be
exercised “for the pro-rata benefit of all shareholders.”9 Following this
“trust paradigm” for corporate law, the judge’s role in corporate law
would be to scrutinize management and use their equitable powers to
provide “solutions to problems that demanded a remedy.”10 Although
the details of this view changed over time, for forty years, the belief
that the power imbalance between shareholders and managers was a
problem, and that the solution was increased oversight and regulation
of one form or another, constituted the dominant framework for
corporate law scholarship.11
In the early 1970s, when Cox entered the academy, perhaps the
ablest defender of this view was Professor Melvin Eisenberg.12
Eisenberg’s pathbreaking work, The Structure of the Corporation,
stands as a high-water mark for the trust-paradigm-inspired legal
scholarship.13 In this work, Eisenberg identified the main shortcomings
7. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1932). On whether or not this prescription was correct, see Brian R.
Cheffins & Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a Myth?, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 443, 466–67
(2009).
8. To be clear, the exact stance taken by the authors of The Modern Corporation and
Private Property is complicated. Although much of the work is an attack on unfettered managerial
power, in at least one famous passage, it welcomes such managerial freedom, looking forward to
a day when management could evolve into a “neutral technocracy” that would manage the
corporation for the interests of multiple constituencies. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at
312–13; see also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail
of The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849, 861–62 (2010)
(explaining Berle’s view that, because public opinion directly affected managers, the outside
community could impose a “conscience” on the corporation).
9. William W. Bratton, An Anatomy of Corporate Legal Theory, 24 RES. L. & ECON. 21, 30
(2009); see Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049
(1931).
10. See Bratton, supra note 9, at 31. Of course, the trust paradigm was significantly modified
over the years, and even if corporate law’s trust paradigm left space for managerial self-interest,
it never approximated trust-law doctrine. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 1498.
11. See CHEFFINS, supra note 1, at 40–49.
12. Cox would later join Eisenberg in his classic business organizations casebook. See
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (11th unabr. ed. 2014).
13. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION (1976). The book
expounds upon and refines the work of several of Eisenberg’s earlier articles: Melvin Aron
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of the existing law as its failure to map the realities of the public
corporation14 and its consequent inability to provide a coherent
framework that would “protect the legitimate interests of
shareholders” while still ensuring the corporation’s efficient
management.15 In some ways, the work was prescient, as when it called
for independent monitoring boards and identified institutional
investors as potential active players in corporate governance.16
That said, its solutions fit comfortably within the existing
paradigm, inasmuch as they were to be incorporated into the
mandatory framework of corporate law.17 Eisenberg’s solution called
for governmental interventions to solve the problems first sketched by
Berle and Means, specifically the problem of managerial “wrongdoing
or impropriety” and the need to protect shareholders.18 Eisenberg’s
specific proposals included improving shareholder access to the proxy
machinery, creating mechanisms to preserve and empower certain
types of noncontractual private ordering, and regulating the work of
auditors and independent directors.19
B. The Rise of the Contractarians
As Cox began his career, the “contractarian” revolution in
corporate law loomed. The contractarians were a group of corporate
law scholars influenced by the spreading law and economics
movement, who picked up an ideological baton first carried by Henry
Manne.20 In a series of articles starting in the early 1960s, Manne had

Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1970); Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors,
and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375 (1975); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Megasubsidiaries: The
Effect of Corporate Structure on Corporate Control, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1577 (1971); Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate
Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1969); see also Bratton, supra note 9, at 30–32 (discussing
generally the trust paradigm of corporate law advocated by Berle and Means).
14. See EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 18.
15. Id. at 319.
16. See id. at 56–63, 156–69.
17. See id. at 317–18.
18. David L. Ratner, Book Review, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1484, 1488 (1976) (reviewing
EISENBERG, supra note 13).
19. EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 317–20.
20. See Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change,
and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
305, 307 n.3, 355 (2013).
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been witheringly critical of Berle and Means.21 Berle and Means had
concluded that, without legal intervention and judicial oversight, the
separation of ownership and control would enable managers to selfdeal and injure shareholders, often with impunity—a conclusion
present as well in Eisenberg’s work. Manne vehemently disagreed.
Why, he asked, would investors continue to invest in equity markets if
managers were as unaccountable as Berle, Means, and their followers
claimed?22 Manne’s answer was that shareholders were already wellprotected. Existing market constraints⎯most notably the market for
corporate control⎯served as effective limits on managerial graft and
overreach.23 Good, efficient managers correlated to strong returns for
healthy companies, and poor, ineffective managers produced weak
returns.24 Stock prices would reflect whether the managers were good
or not, enabling the market for mergers to oust poor managers and shift
those underperforming assets into the hands of better managers, with
shareholders benefiting from the consolidation.25 For Manne, the
market, not mandatory rules for corporate governance, provided the
best protections for shareholders.
Although Manne struggled to be heard in the 1960s and early
1970s, by the late 1970s, his critique gained traction, partially due to the
emergence of transaction-cost-based economic scholarship,26 which in
turn was heavily influenced by Professor Ronald Coase. In his classic
21. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, The “Higher Criticism” of the Corporation, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 399, 399–407 (1962); see also Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 117–20 (1965) [hereinafter Manne, The Market for Corporate
Control] (addressing Berle’s contention that control is a corporate asset); Henry G. Manne, Some
Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1431 n.13 (1964) (stating that the
Berle and Means thesis of ownership and control “fits foundations, universities, and other
nonprofit organizations far better than it does the large corporation in which it was designed”).
22. Henry G. Manne, The Myth of Corporate Responsibility or Will the Real Ralph Nader
Please Stand Up?, 26 BUS. LAW. 533, 534 (1970). Manne states:
[I]f things were as Berle believed, it is very difficult to understand why 30 million
Americans would continue to put money into the hands of corporate
executives . . . . We would have to assume that American investors were either the
greatest collection of fools the world had ever seen or that they were charitable to a
degree that even saints could not aspire to.
Id.
23. See Manne, The Market for Corporate Control, supra note 21, at 117–20.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See Romano, supra note 1, at 347, 349–51. But see William J. Carney, The Legacy of “The
Market for Corporate Control” and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 215, 227, 231–33, 238–44 (1999) (arguing that Manne’s ideas influenced this field of study
and the courts through the late 1960s and early 1970s, before his ideas spread more widely through
the academy).
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article The Nature of the Firm, Coase sought to address the question of
“why a firm emerges at all in a specialized exchange economy.”27 Coase
presented his theory as a tradeoff between the benefits of market
exchanges, in which an entity would choose a contractual relation with
an outside party, against internal firm exchanges, in which the
hierarchical firm structure was preferred.28 In showing how contracting
costs help explain firm formation, Coase provided legal academics a
glimpse inside the “black box” of the firm.29
In 1976, Professors Michael Jensen and William Meckling
operationalized Coase’s views of the “black box” for the legal
academy.30 Using the familiar paradigm from Berle and
Means⎯centered on the separation of ownership from
control⎯Jensen and Meckling provided “systematic economic
content” to the earlier observations by couching their studies in
marginal utility and introducing agency-cost theory into their
analysis.31 Jensen claimed that this sort of economic analysis would
rapidly permeate the field.32 And as economic theory expanded from
market applications to judicial decisionmaking33 to corporate law
scholarship, Jensen’s claim seemed accurate.34
Undoubtedly the most influential work applying law and
economics to corporate law was that of Judge Frank Easterbrook and
Professor Daniel Fischel. In a series of articles—and then their classic
book The Economic Structure of Corporate Law—they effectively
founded the contractarian school, blazing a trail for later law and

27. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390 (1937).
28. Id.; see Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of The Nature of the Firm on the Theory of
Corporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213, 214 (1993).
29. Johnston, supra note 28, at 215–16.
30. Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs & Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
31. See CHEFFINS, supra note 1, at 44–45; Romano, supra note 1, at 347.
32. Michael C. Jensen, Organization Theory & Methodology, 58 ACCT. REV. 319, 324 (1983).
33. Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics and Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
281, 294 (1979).
34. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981). Easterbrook and Fischel’s work
would become the most-cited article of the 1980s and the twenty-fourth most-cited article of all
time as of 1996. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 751, 761, 765 (1996). Their work trails only Manne’s Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control amongst corporate works for citations, and is one of only three corporate law pieces in
the top one hundred most-cited law review articles. Id.
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economics scholars.35 Beginning in 1981 with The Proper Role of a
Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, Easterbrook
and Fischel supplemented legal analysis with an empirical study of
stock prices and market mechanisms.36 They not only showed how
certain transactions created value but also how market-based “selfdeterring” mirrored and buttressed corporate law.37 In doing so, their
work also presented a powerful presumption that ran counter to much
of corporate law scholarship up until that point: rather than require
further regulation, corporate entities would, on their own, select their
own governance to the point that it was efficient and profitable.38 As
one reviewer of their book noted, in Easterbrook and Fischel’s
account, corporate law already provided participants in the
corporation the protection they needed, and “the need for legal
reforms and government regulation goes out the window.”39
By the mid-1980s, the “prairie fire” of law and economics
analysis—particularly its contractarian version, which depicted the
corporation as a mere “nexus of contracts”—had swept through the
academy.40 This analysis helped explain existing market-actor
behavior,41 while deemphasizing shareholder protection as a core
function of corporate law. In characterizing corporate law as enabling
35. For a more complete accounting of their groundbreaking work, see generally FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
(1991); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and
Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE. L.J. 698 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions]; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory
Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983).
36. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
37. E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, supra note 35, at 707.
38. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 9, at 34–35 (discussing the “deregulatory presumption” in
modern corporate law and the prevalence of self-regulating strategies).
39. Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 2215, 2222 (1992).
40. CHEFFINS, supra note 1, at 28 (quoting Douglas Branson, A Corporate Paleontologist’s
Look at Law and Economics in the Seventh Circuit, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 745 (1989)).
41. See generally Bhagat & Romano, supra note 4 (listing examples of empirical studies that
incorporate economic research and explain topics as diverse as the value of minority shareholder
voting rights, the emergence of “corporate specialization,” the overpayment of bidders, the
synergistic gains of corporate-acquiring firms, and the effectiveness of antitakeover
amendments).
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law that conformed to economic rationality rather than mandatory law
that imposed strictures on the self-interested, the contractarian school
implicitly validated the present structures of corporate law and pushed
for fewer mandatory provisions in the law. By the end of the decade, it
was clear that the value judgment presented in Berle and Means’s
original work⎯that separation of ownership from control was a
problem in need of a solution⎯was no longer treated as gospel.42 To
some, it just sounded like a plea to retain the status quo.43
C. The Response to Contractarianism
Although a majority of academics conceded the general merits of
economic and other social-science-based methods of analysis, many
sharply disputed the contractarians’ conclusions.44 Eisenberg was one
of the most prominent critics. Having been the profession’s leading
voice for continuing the work started by Berle and Means, he struggled
to use the new tools of economics, and his work was sharply challenged
by many of the new school of corporate scholars throughout the
1980s.45
In important corners of the profession, however, Eisenberg’s
arguments were being echoed. Authors like William Allen,46 Victor
42. William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87
NW. U. L. REV. 180, 190 (1992); see also Robert John Schulze, Book Note, Can This Marriage Be
Saved? Reconciling Progressivism with Profits in Corporate Governance Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1607 (1997) (reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995))
(challenging a series of critiques of the corporate law theory paradigm).
43. It should be noted that law and economics approaches need not result in the
antiregulatory conclusions reached by Easterbrook and Fischel—hence the need to distinguish
between their version of contractarianism and broader approaches to economic theory. For a
different take focusing on the theory of the firm, see Bodie, supra note 1.
44. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An
Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1626 (1989) (“[T]he permissibility of
deviations from the traditional standards of corporate law should be judged primarily in terms of
the competence of courts or other agencies to monitor these departures and prevent
opportunism.”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law
Literature, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582, 589–90, 595–97 (1984); id. at 595 (“[I]t is extremely
unlikely that market forces acting alone will produce an optimal solution of agency-cost problems
in the context of the publicly held corporation.”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1585–98 (1989) (highlighting the importance of
corporate law legal rules created by the courts and the legislature).
45. For an example of this type of critique, see generally Ralph K. Winter, The “Race for the
Top” Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526 (1989).
46. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 278 (1992) (“To approach understanding, we must be able to see legal
rules and principles as social constructs, affected by their internal logic, but affected even more
profoundly by the social world in which they exist.”).
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Brudney,47 and John Coffee48 raised similar critiques about the lack of
normative values presented by those in the law and economics space.49
These critiques increased when the law and economics school
eventually attempted to assert certain normative values by using
market discipline.50 Gradually, these anticontractarian critics
challenged the contractarians’ assumptions by using the contractarians’
own law and economics tools.51 Some assumptions were questioned on
theoretical grounds;52 others were proven incorrect in practice.53
Beginning in the 1980s, Cox joined the challenge to the rapid
expansion of contractarianism and its underlying behavioral
assumptions. In so doing, he provided new and innovative defenses of
the belief that shareholders still needed protection by the mechanisms
of corporation law. Here, we briefly outline some of his more
important pieces from this period and explain their significance in the
debates.
1. Bias in the Boardroom. In the pathbreaking article Bias in the
Boardroom, Cox and his coauthor, Professor Harry Munsinger, draw
on psychological research about insider bias to challenge the

47. Victor Brudney, The Role of the Board of Directors: The ALI and its Critics, 37 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 223, 235 (1983).
48. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders,
Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 435, 439.
49. For an overview of these debates, see generally Symposium, The Debate on Contractual
Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989).
50. See Johnston, supra note 28, at 241 (describing the values of the law and economics
school). According to Johnston:
[T]he explanatory power of the economic approach to corporate law . . . derives very
largely from the fact that this approach is a theory of what competitive forces should
eventually, in the long run, constrain rational economic actors to do. Under such an
approach, the pattern of corporate governance structures which we observe at any
point in time . . . are presumed to be efficient, equilibrium choices, because in the long
run, only such choices will survive.
Id.
51. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 583–84 (1992).
52. E.g., Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific
Method, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 266–72 (1989); Mark V. Tushnet, Law, Science, and Law and
Economics, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 51–52 (1997).
53. E.g., Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1059 (1991) (noting that, contrary to what law and economics theorists
hypothesized, in practice, veil piercing of limited-liability corporations occurred more regularly
in contractual rather that tort settings).
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contractarians’ rational-actor model of human behavior.54 They focus
on a topic that Cox would repeatedly return to: the shareholder
derivative action. The article begins by asking how much we can rely
upon independent directors to monitor corporate management and
each other.55 The widely accepted, economically oriented-Jensen and
Meckling-monitoring model of the corporation had assumed that
independent directors would do this, acting in shareholders’ best
interests.56
Drilling into this assumption, Cox and Munsinger questioned its
accuracy. They offered “a psychological perspective on a specific
application of the monitoring function: the independent directors’
assessment [of] whether the corporation’s interest is served by a
derivative suit against their ‘insider’ colleagues.”57 In particular, the
authors focused on independent directors’ ability to perceive and
represent the corporation’s interests in evaluating a demand on the
board or when serving on a special litigation committee (SLC). They
concluded that “several psychological mechanisms can be expected to
generate subtle, but powerful, biases which result in the independent
directors’ reaching a decision insulating colleagues on the board from
legal sanctions.”58
The heart of the article lays out the psychological research related
to in-group bias, which is especially problematic within the boardroom.
The article focuses on uncertainty and director bias,59 social needs and
director service,60 and self-validation and director bias.61 The authors
apply these concepts to suggest that there is a strong bias in the

54. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations
and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985).
55. See id. at 84 (“We are interested in the independent directors’ ability to perceive and
represent the corporate interest in evaluating a demand to the board or in serving on a special
litigation committee.”).
56. See generally Michael Jenson & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, in THE MODERN THEORY OF CORPORATE
FINANCE (Michael C. Jensen & Clifford H. Smith Jr. eds., 1984) (laying out the monitoring model
of the corporation). In fairness, Eisenberg made almost the same assumption. See EISENBERG,
supra note 13, at 174–77 (noting that independent directors had to be “independent in fact as well
as in form”).
57. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 54, at 84.
58. Id. at 85.
59. Id. at 85–91.
60. Id. at 91–99.
61. Id. at 99–108.
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boardroom against plaintiff shareholders and that even outside
directors cannot be expected to operate impartially.62
Bias in the Boardroom then connects its criticism of the academic
theory to the problems with then-current doctrine by examining the
analytical approaches for SLC reports offered by courts and the
American Law Institute’s (ALI) Corporate Governance Project.63 It
dissects the leading cases on the appropriate standard of judicial review
for SLC reports and rejects each one.64 The authors advocated both for
having court-appointed members of the SLC and for disallowing the
committee’s recommendation whenever it “implicates a colleague of
the directors, be that colleague a fellow director, control person, or a
senior executive who associates on a regular basis with the directors.”65
They conclude that SLC should be appointed by the court and should
not include any of the defendants’ colleagues, past or present, or even
those sharing a cultural identity with the defendants.66
This key article was widely seen as offering a new and insightful
critique of the use of SLCs and their impact on shareholder litigation.67
By bringing the tools of psychology to bear, Cox and Munsinger offer
insights that law and economics scholarship missed. Equally important,
they provide a sophisticated critique of the view that market forces and
existing corporate law sufficed in providing adequate shareholder
protection.
2. Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the
“Chicago School.” Nowhere is Cox’s resistance to contractarianism
more apparent than in his article Insider Trading and Contracting: A
Critical Response to the “Chicago School,” which directly tackles
Chicago School arguments that favored legalizing insider trading.68 The
article opens by criticizing the deficient grounds that the Supreme
Court had previously offered for condemning insider trading as well as
the theories that commentators had offered to fill its jurisprudential

62. Id. at 107.
63. See id. at 108–31.
64. See id.
65. Id. at 132.
66. Id. at 134.
67. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the
Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal
Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 286 n.6 (2004) (arguing that SLCs are suspect for multiple reasons).
68. James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the “Chicago
School,” 1986 DUKE L.J. 628.
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holes, such as the view that insider trading adversely affects the stock
market’s allocative efficiency.69 Its main thrust, though, is a direct
response to the Chicago School’s claims that insider trading should be
permitted and that the law should allow corporations to license their
officers and directors to engage in it.70
Briefly, the Chicago School academics had argued that there was
no empirical evidence that insider trading harms anyone.71 Cox
counters that there was no empirical evidence that it is not harmful
either and that, as the challengers to the status quo, the proponents of
legalization should be required to make such a showing.72 A second
argument for dropping the ban was that insider trading promotes
stock-price adjustments.73 But, as Cox notes, insider trading is a much
less efficient way to disclose information than regular corporate filings,
and it could lead to disclosures that harm the corporation’s interest in
withholding some confidential information to preserve its business
advantages.74
Chicago School scholars had further claimed that allowing insider
trading would avoid periodic and wasteful negotiations between the
company and managers over compensation by allowing managers to
unilaterally reset their compensation.75 Cox has several responses to
this claim, such as: What are the alternative ways for companies to sell
their information?76 Will managers do this in a way that maximizes
shareholder value?77 And will it encourage the creation of valuable
information or just lead to self-dealing transactions?78
Finally, the proponents of lifting the ban on insider trading argued
that managers and stockholders would like to be able to contract for
the right to participate in insider trading because that would benefit
both sides.79 This claim’s validity turns on the shareholders’ ability to

69. See id. at 635–42.
70. See id. at 642–55.
71. Id. at 642. This view of insider trading was widespread. Among the classic works arguing
for it were HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966), and Dennis
W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983).
72. Cox, supra note 68, at 644.
73. Id. at 645–48.
74. Id. at 648.
75. Id. at 649–53.
76. Id. at 650–51.
77. Id. at 651.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 653–55.
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contract efficiently given their information disadvantage. Cox points
out that it is difficult for shareholders to estimate the costs and benefits
of insider trading, especially in public companies.80 In addition,
corporations have several interests that would be affected by allowing
insider trading, including the need to understand the executives’
motives and compensation sources, the need for full information to
assess the executives’ stewardship, and the shareholders’ desire that
executives concentrate on the welfare of the company rather than their
private investment agenda.81
3. Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for
Derivative Suit Procedures. Cox returned to shareholder litigation in
his article Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for
Derivative Suit Procedures, which delves into the purpose of the
derivative suit.82 Deterrence and compensation are often mentioned as
the twin goals of derivative litigation, but sometimes, as Cox notes,
these goals are in conflict.83 When they do conflict, he asks, how should
the conflict be resolved?
Initially, Cox attacks the contractarians’ view that derivative suits
are unnecessary because market forces are sufficient to police
management wrongdoing. He deploys economic analysis to argue that
this view is incorrect for several reasons. First, market monitoring only
prevents extreme deviations, and the law should impose fiduciary
obligations to establish the parameters of mutually acceptable
conduct.84 Second, although portfolio theory suggests that holding a
diversified group of stocks eliminates unsystemic risks, managerialmisconduct levels are a form of systemic risk that can be lowered by
the deterrence value of derivative suits.85 Finally, he contends that the
market for corporate control is inadequate because there must be
massive misconduct to appreciably drive down the stock price, and
most of the time, managerial misconduct is only a “one shot” breach of
fiduciary duties.86

80. Id. at 654.
81. Id. at 658–59.
82. James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative
Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745 (1984).
83. Id. at 746.
84. Id. at 748.
85. Id. at 752.
86. Id. at 753.
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After he establishes the necessity of derivative suits, Cox
addresses limitations on these cases that spring from concerns that such
suits would lessen shareholders’ incentives to monitor managers or
impose liability on directors who engage in legitimate risk-taking
activities. Here, Cox argues that shareholder monitoring is only
economical to a point and that the derivative suit’s enforcement of
fiduciary duties is necessary to deter managerial misconduct.87
Furthermore, it does not inhibit risk-taking if courts treat duty-of-care
claims as seriously as duty-of-loyalty claims even though the latter are
more frequently upheld.88 Because the two sets of issues are often
intertwined, and even though the duty of care is only violated in
egregious cases, the duty of care is a minimal standard of legal
performance.89
Cox argues that courts had overemphasized compensation as a
goal for derivative actions, in some cases allowing it to eclipse
deterrence altogether. For example, courts dismissed cases in which
there was no corporate injury—even if they involved knowing criminal
violations—because the corporation benefited from the managers’
actions.90 Cox argues that courts should consider the deterrence
benefits from chastening managers by allowing a modest recovery or
by ordering corporate-governance changes that would prevent a
reoccurrence, even in cases in which no injury can be shown.91
Yet the balance can also tip the other way. Cox argues that, in the
ALI’s then-proposed Principles of Corporate Governance, Drafts 1–3,
there was too strong a preference for deterrence as a goal for the
derivative suit instead of compensation.92 This had the adverse effect
of ignoring important compensatory issues that derivative suits should
also address.93
4. The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits. Although Cox
maintained his scholarly focus on corporate and securities law issues,
his wide-ranging response to law and economics led him to draw on
economics and psychology and eventually emerging scholarship
around social meaning and social norms. In The Social Meaning of
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 758.
Id. at 760–61.
Id. at 761–63.
Id. at 765 n.97.
Id. at 775–76.
Id. at 777–79.
Id. at 777.
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Shareholder Suits, Cox examines the public image of shareholder
lawsuits, their “expressive value,” to determine if there are particular
characteristics of class actions and derivative suits that enhance or
detract from people perceiving them as a positive social force. 94 The
public image of these suits is critical because it determines whether
managers will change their behavior if there is a threat of being a
defendant in shareholder litigation.95 Cox uses Professor Lawrence
Lessig’s techniques for constructing social meaning to determine which
features of shareholder litigation are consistent with the process of
establishing business-organization norms.96
Here, Cox again considers the interaction between deterrence and
compensation as goals in shareholder suits. He concluded that
compensation is the “prevailing objective of shareholder suits” with
“deterrence [as] its valuable byproduct.”97 He argues that this
hierarchy of goals dilutes the social meaning of shareholder suits
because compensation is a private matter whereas deterrence is a
public good.98 Emphasizing compensation muddies the suits’
expression of social values, he claims, weakening the public perception
that shareholder suits reflect society’s condemnation of the
misconduct.99 Settlements similarly emphasize the private nature of
shareholder suits by breaking those suits’ link to the state and speaking
to the proportionality of the consideration supporting the contract
instead of admonishing the company for violating laws and social
norms.100
Such framing—placing an emphasis on suits’ compensatory
function—may adversely affect one’s image of the suit because leading
academics and other lawyers evaluate the suits’ success by whether
they result in proper compensation for injured parties.101 Because suits
tend to yield low-percentage recoveries for shareholders, they are
assessed by many as a failure.102 This perception of failure is
compounded by the fact that Directors and Officers’ (D&O) insurance

94. James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3 (1999).
95. Id. at 5.
96. Id. at 7–8 (citing Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
943 (1995)).
97. Id. at 8.
98. Id. at 11.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 11–12.
101. Id. at 13.
102. Id. at 14–16.
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carriers pay all settlement amounts, so individual managers and
directors do not contribute any personal funds for wrongdoing. This
tendency to overemphasize compensation is exacerbated by the fact
that deterrence is not easily measureable in economic figures, so it is
not heavily weighed.
There are ways to change the social meaning of lawsuits. Cox
points out that strong pretrial procedures can help create a positive
impression of shareholder suits. For example, the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) had such an effect by adding
stricter pleading requirements and a discovery bar for securities-fraud
class actions, which helped ensure that stronger suits were filed.103 In
contrast, D&O insurance coverage does little to burnish the suits’
social meaning. Even though D&O policies have exclusions for
intentional misconduct, shareholder suits almost always settle within
the amounts of the D&O insurance coverage without any contribution
by individual defendants.
Finally, the use of certain rituals may reinforce the positive social
meaning of shareholder suits. For instance, under the terms of the
PSLRA’s “lead plaintiff” provision, courts appoint the lead plaintiff,
creating an “important public connection” that also reinforces “the
legitimacy of the suit[].”104 With derivative suits, however, no such
process existed at the time The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits
was published (although it has since become more prevalent in
Delaware105), and the court engaged in the demand-requirement
inquiry. Settlements in these cases are also problematic in light of social
meaning: they are lawyer and insurance driven and “do not reflect the
broader private interest of the class or corporation or . . . the public
objective of deterrence.”106
So what can be done to improve the social image of the
shareholder suit? First, as Cox suggests, shareholder suits should
explicitly elevate the goal of deterrence over that of compensation and
call on individual defendants to make contributions to the settlement
to increase the suit’s deterrence value.107 Second, they should
103. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
104. Id. at 29.
105. See generally Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative
Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1753
(2012) (detailing Delaware’s increased popularity as a forum for shareholder litigation).
106. Cox, supra note 94, at 34.
107. See id. at 39–40.
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reinvigorate the adequacy-of-the-plaintiff requirement in derivative
suits to make it more like the PSLRA lead-plaintiff determination and
provide standing for nonintervenors to object to the settlement and to
appeal.108 Finally, Cox condemns the corrupting influence of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Epstein,109 which promoted forum shopping by defense firms and
“weaken[ed] the ritual of settlement.”110
II. NEW DIRECTIONS
By the end of the 1990s, the battle over contractarianism had
stalemated. Law and economics had, it appeared, become almost
universally accepted as the central tool for corporate law. But the
nexus-of-contracts model of the corporation—and its implicit
devaluation of shareholder protection as a central goal of corporate
law—had not won over all of its opponents.111 Economic analysis, many
concluded, could serve as a tool to justify legal conclusions but could
not, on its own, definitively answer policy questions surrounding
corporate accountability and governance.112 What intellectual
coherence could be found formed instead around a set of less sweeping
assumptions about corporate law and governance: that boards serve as
monitors instead of managers,113 that investors and boards contract for
certain expectations of protection subject to market-based and
regulatory frictions,114 and that those protections have normative
decisions attached to them beyond pure profit-seeking motives.115
Quite possibly, changes in the corporate economy over the
previous two decades had undermined scholars’ faith in a single
narrative for corporate law, while redirecting scholarly attention
toward specific developments and the construction of empirical tools
to better understand them. For instance, shifts in the nature of
corporate shareholding led to the reconsideration of once-bedrock
assumptions about shareholder powerlessness. Shareholders
108. See id. at 41–44.
109. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
110. Cox, supra note 94, at 38 (citing Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 373); see also Thomas &
Thompson, supra note 105, at 1766–67, 1770 (pointing out how Matsushita “stimulated
multijurisdictional litigation filings” and led to reverse auctions by defense law firms).
111. CHEFFINS, supra note 1, at 29.
112. See Bratton, supra note 42, at 193–97.
113. See id. at 186 n.37.
114. See id. at 180, 186–90.
115. See id. at 212.
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increasingly came in “many sizes and shapes,”116 and as a result, older
models of shareholder behavior that presumed diffuse ownership
rapidly lost validity.117 Similarly, questions reemerged about the value
of shareholder primacy and its economic desirability.118 New criticisms
also appeared about the presumption that boards behaved rationally
to maximize shareholder value119 and about the processes by which
firms determined their organizational boundaries.120 All the while, new
intellectual developments threw into doubt the economic theories
underlying much of this legal analysis as behavioral economics
emerged from classical microeconomic modeling as a distinct school of
thought.121
These developments may explain why Cox’s interests and most
significant publications moved toward closer studies of new
developments in the corporate governance system. In the late 1990s,
his attention was drawn to questions such as how globalization and
technological change challenged shareholder protections,122 how
gatekeepers like the accounting profession could perform their roles in
the aftermath of corporate scandals,123 and how the new tools of
empirical legal research could be deployed to answer pressing
questions in corporate law.124

116. Jack B. Jacobs, Some Legal and Policy Implications of the New Shareholder Paradigm,
22 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Mar./Apr. 2014, at 1, 2.
117. Id. See generally Leo. E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the
Common Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499 (2002) (advocating for corporate law
judges to adapt to changing understandings of the business world).
118. Zhong Xing Tan, Stewardship in the Interests of Systemic Stakeholders: Reconceptualizing the Means and Ends of Anglo-American Corporate Governance in the Wake of
the Global Financial Crisis, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 169, 173–79 (2014).
119. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role
of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 406 (2001).
120. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law,
110 YALE L.J. 387, 391–93 (2000).
121. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 442 (Claire A. Hill & Brett
H. McDonald eds., 2012) (explaining how behavioral economics and psychology can be applied
to understanding corporate law structures).
122. See, e.g., James D. Cox, The Fundamentals of an Electronic-Based Federal Securities Act,
75 WASH. U. L.Q. 857, 873–75 (1997); James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities
Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200, 1244–52 (1999) [hereinafter Cox, Regulatory Duopoly].
123. See infra Part II.A.
124. See infra Part II.B.
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A. Standards and Gatekeepers
Some of Cox’s most insightful and prescient writings during this
period focused on accounting—long an area of particular expertise for
him125—as he examined both the growing battle over U.S.
corporations’ accounting standards and the changing nature of the
accounting profession in the United States. Starting in the late 1990s,
Cox wrote a series of key articles on the evolution of accounting
standards and the accounting profession, examining the challenges that
each posed to the U.S. securities markets and corporate governance
systems. This Section highlights three of his best-known pieces that
responded to globalization, regulatory competition, and financial
collapses, each implicating the role of accounting standards and the
accounting profession.
1. Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets. Cox opens his
1999 article Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets by
observing that globalization and technological advances had
“nurture[d] an environment of regulatory competition among
nations.” He then focuses his attention on recent debates over whether
the SEC should allow issuers to reconcile their financial statements
using International Accounting Standards (IAS) instead of the U.S.generated Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).126
Although giving due weight to the technical differences between the
standards, Cox uses the issue to engage with larger questions about the
dubious benefits promised by regulatory competition.
The article situates the specific standards under consideration in
their larger institutional and cultural contexts. GAAP was developed
by the Financial Standards Accounting Board (FASB), a robust U.S.
organization significantly insulated from government and private
sector pressures that possesses notable expertise. The International
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), overseer of IAS (and later
IAS’s successor, the International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS)), lacked these qualities.127 Thus, the decision to allow U.S.
125. See, e.g., JAMES D. COX, FINANCIAL INFORMATION, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS (1980).
126. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note 122, at 1201. For descriptions of the ongoing
attempt to import international accounting standards, see generally Lawrence A. Cunningham,
The SEC’s Global Accounting Vision: A Realistic Appraisal of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1 (2008); Martin Gelter & Zehra G. Kavame Eroglu, Whose Trojan Horse? The Dynamics of
Resistance Against IFRS, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 89 (2014).
127. See Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note 122, at 1206–08.
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issuers to adopt IAS involved not just a choice between two standards
but between two organizational frameworks. This change would
require the SEC, assuming the SEC wanted to maintain its dominant
role in regulating U.S. markets, to “assure itself that the IASC has a
governance structure and operating processes sufficient to assure it can
continually establish high-quality financial reporting standards,”128 and
it would also require the SEC to evaluate other nations’ accounting
cultures to decide whether they sufficiently tracked those of the United
States.129 There may, Cox concedes, be benefits from the SEC allowing
U.S. issuers to use IAS: issuers could for instance benefit if cross-listing
in foreign markets reduced their cost of capital.130 But it is difficult to
determine if those benefits outweighed the costs.131
Cox then deepens his focus by taking on advocates for regulatory
competition in securities markets. Here he continues his fight against a
knee-jerk adoption of the contractarian approach. In particular, Cox
challenges arguments in favor of allowing accounting standards to be
set by an issuer’s domicile or allowing an issuer to choose any regime’s
disclosure requirements.132 He argues that “[u]nderlying each of these
proposals is the belief that regulatory competition . . . is more likely to
result in disclosure standards that are optimal for investors and
issuers.”133 Cox points out the many flaws to these arguments: there are
not many competing regulators, there is not perfect information that
discounting between different jurisdictions based on jurisdictionspecific disclosure requirements actually occurs, and there may be
staggering enforcement difficulties if corporations could indeed choose
which standard to follow.134 In contrast, he contends, that there are
benefits to be derived from a single or lead standard-setter, such as the
SEC, developing and overseeing these standards.135
In the end, although Cox rejects more radical arguments for
regulatory competition, he acknowledges that there is still a lack of
“hard evidence bearing on the intrinsic merits of the exclusivity of U.S.
GAAP.”136 Given the political pressures placed on the SEC at that
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 1210.
See id. at 1211.
See id. at 1219–21.
See id. at 1219–23.
See id. at 1229–33.
Id. at 1230.
Id. at 1232–33, 1239.
See id. at 1237–44.
Id. at 1244.
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time, it seemed that the adoption of IAS was inevitable.137 The SEC’s
best approach, he concludes, was to take an active role in overseeing
measured acceptance of IAS: “Experience gained by the SEC’s
incremental embrace of IAS . . . will surely provide experience that the
SEC can apply when considering foreign-based disclosure standards in
the future.”138 In sum, Cox doubts the value of the IAS but saw its
adoption as unavoidable, so he charted a path forward that leaves a
strong role for the SEC to maintain its oversight of public companies.139
Cox’s focus on the SEC’s important role as overseer of accounting
standards leads him into a careful analysis of the accounting profession
itself.140 His analysis became urgent with the bursting of the Internet
bubble in 2000 and the series of corporate scandals that began with
Enron in 2001, events in which the accounting profession played a
major role.
2. Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and
the Metrics for Accounting Measurements. After the corporate
debacles of 2000–2002, widespread criticism was leveled at the
accounting profession for allowing the disasters to occur. In his article
Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and the
Metrics for Accounting Measurements, Cox surveys a number of
responses to this crisis, from calls for principles-based accounting to the
various reforms bundled together in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(Sarbanes-Oxley). But he asks whether more basic features of
accounting relationships contributed to accounting’s apparent failure
and what changes might be needed to restore investors’ faith in public
companies.141
For Cox, the underlying problem in the accounting profession is
that too many of its members are willing to abandon their publicoverseer role and compromise their independence to help clients.142
Like other observers, he blames the erosion of independence in large
part on the growing importance of nonaudit services for accounting

137. Id. at 1247. This adoption did not ultimately happen, due in part to the aftermath of the
2008 financial crisis.
138. Id. at 1252.
139. Id. at 1244–50.
140. Id. at 1228–52.
141. James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and the
Metrics for Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301 (2003).
142. See id. at 308–10.
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firms.143 In 1976, “audit fees constituted [70] percent of accounting firm
revenues; by 1998 audit fees had fallen to [31] percent of their
revenues.”144 Why this eroded independence was unclear: perhaps
accounting firms treat accounting fees as “loss leader[s]”145 to enter
more competitive consulting fields, or perhaps management uses the
threat of lost consulting fees to obtain more favorable treatment from
auditors.146 Whatever the mechanism, accountants’ professional
judgment appears compromised by the changing nature of their firms’
businesses.147
What to do? Cox refuses to blame the rule-oriented nature of
GAAP for the problem. Some had claimed that this approach made it
“too easy for the accountant to rationalize that if a specific treatment
is not prohibited, then it must be permissible.”148 If anything, Cox
points out, accounting trickery would be easier under an approach that
abandoned rules in favor of broad principles that gave auditors greater
discretion as to how to apply them.149 Furthermore, current law already
incorporated elements identified with a principles-based approach. A
leading case, for example, required disclosures to provide a “fair
presentation of the company’s assets, liabilities, revenues, and
expenses.”150 And this approach was reinforced in Sarbanes-Oxley’s
“strengthened requirements of the audit committee and the executive
certifications [intended] to drive reporting toward principles, or at least
a single principle, of fair presentation, and away from a more technical
orientation toward rules.”151
The reference to Sarbanes-Oxley points to a different approach
that was embodied in its provisions, strengthening the audit committee
and “anchor[ing] the accountant’s relationship in the audit committee
and not in management.”152 To this end, Sarbanes-Oxley tightens the
143. See id. at 309–10.
144. Id. at 310.
145. Id. at 312.
146. Id. at 313.
147. Id. at 314. Cox noted that (at least in 2002) there was no “solid empirical support that
nonaudit services . . . systematically compromise[d] the quality of the outside accountant’s audit.”
Id. at 313. It would be foolish, however, to ignore the intuitions and less systematic evidence that
such influence occurred. Id. at 314–15.
148. Id. at 303.
149. Id. at 309.
150. Id. at 320 (citing United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1006 (1970)).
151. Id. at 321.
152. Id. at 307.
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definition of independence for audit committee members, creates
strong pressure to make one member a “financial expert,”153 empowers
the committee to engage its own independent experts, and—crucial in
Cox’s view—“impose[s] a dialogue between the audit committee and
the outside accountants.” 154
Yet even this is not enough, and here we see again Cox’s sensitivity
to the larger contexts within which laws and rules operate. For all the
legal changes made, “there is good cause for concern that the culture
of accounting has not yet moved forward to reflect these changes.”155
The auditor’s independence requires the auditor to operate
independently from management, and yet there was little evidence of
this. Hence the article’s closing, in which Cox calls for the new Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to reinvigorate
accounting’s social role and “foster[] an environment for auditors to
perform their vocation as professionals.”156 In this way, the new body
would have a “significant contribution to making audit committees
effective guardians of stockholders’ interests.” 157
3. The Oligopolistic Gatekeeper: The U.S. Accounting Profession.
In the book chapter The Oligopolistic Gatekeeper: The U.S. Accounting
Profession, written a few years after the previous article, Cox returns
to the problems with the accounting industry, focusing on how its
structure helped cause the industry’s transformation “from a
profession to a business” and asking what further reforms could
mitigate still-existing problems within the field.158 He begins with
startling facts driving home the existence of a “tight oligopoly” in
accounting: accounting is now so concentrated that, at the time the
chapter was written, the “Big Four” firms performed 97 percent of all
public-company audits for companies with sales over $250 million. In
some industries, accounting was effectively dominated by a single
firm.159 Despite this contention, there was little evidence that the Big

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 327.
Id.
James D. Cox, The Oligopolistic Gatekeeper: The US Accounting Profession, in AFTER
ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING SECURITIES REGULATION IN
EUROPE AND THE US 294, 296 (John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2006).
159. Id. at 297, 298 (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-864, PUBLIC
ACCOUNTING FIRMS: MANDATED STUDY ON CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITION 16 (2003)).
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Four had colluded to raise prices for accounting work, likely due to
obstacles to collusion including a lack of transparency in accounting
fees, which makes monitoring any kind of explicit or implicit
agreement tough, and a lack of an effective means for punishing
defectors from an explicit or implicit agreement.160
But, strangely enough, neither is there any evidence of vigorous
competition in the accounting field—what competition that does occur
between big accounting firms is for nonaudit services.161 Accounting
firms had apparently concluded that “profits could better be obtained
through expanding their consulting operations than to expend efforts
to wrest audit clients from their competitors.”162 For Cox, this lack of
competition is particularly harmful to investors. Financial theory
predicts that in such a concentrated industry an accounting firm would
seek a competitive edge by offering “superior” accounting services to
clients and foreswearing nonaudit services. It also predicts that public
companies eager to impress capital markets with the stringency of their
financial statements would hire these independent accounting firms.
This prediction has not come true, in large part because of the
attractiveness of charging consulting (nonaudit) fees: Each firm
“pursued the same parallel behavior of leveraging their audit
relationship to expand their profits through the rapid growth of
consulting. . . . [E]ach firm’s pursuit of this parallel strategy was made
possible by the industry’s concentration.”163 What results is today’s
unsatisfactory situation, in which audits are dominated by the Big Four,
but each firm is reliant on nonaudit fees that reduce their independence
and the reliability of their attestations. Industry structure, not greed
alone, produces this problematic situation.
Sarbanes-Oxley improved what came before it, but it left the basic
industry structure in place. And such reforms as were adopted had
begun eroding by the time this chapter appeared in 2006, as evidenced
by Congress’s intervention to block proposals that would have
required the expensing of stock options and the SEC’s approval of
amendments to disclosure requirements that obscured the distinction
between some audit and nonaudit fees.164
For example, “76.4 per cent of total assets of the petroleum and coal products industry were
audited by Pricewaterhouse Coopers.” Id. at 298.
160. Id. at 301–03.
161. See id. at 307–08.
162. Id. at 308.
163. Id. at 316.
164. See id. at 328.
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Cox concludes the piece with several proposals designed to
ameliorate this problem, such as increased, more accurate disclosure of
audit and nonaudit payments—which would give the market a better
sense of the auditor’s dependence on the client165—and requiring 8-K
reporting when a client terminates an auditor’s nonaudit consulting
relationship—which may cast a harsh light on management’s
manipulation of the nonaudit fees.166 The availability of PCAOB
reports on auditors may also improve the situation, allowing audit
committees to measure the quality of auditors.167 Most radically, Cox
proposes mandatory periodic rotation of auditors, a move that might
finally shake up this oligopoly and reignite competition in the field.168
4. Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75Year-Old SEC. Cox also kept an eye on the larger currents of
globalization and technological change that were transforming U.S.
securities markets and asked how the SEC should respond. Cast in
broader terms, he asks: “[C]an an agency created and operating
through most of its years in the internationally insulated environment
of U.S. capital markets survive in a world without borders[?]”169 As he
had done before, he focuses on accounting standards, particularly the
recent SEC decision to allow foreign issuers to reconcile their financial
reports to IFRS rather than GAAP.170 But his real goal is to reveal how
“globalization forces us to rethink the ultimate role of securities
regulation in an environment of global trading and offerings.”171 The
article also offers Cox another opportunity to challenge opponents of
mandatory disclosure.
The SEC’s limited acceptance of the IFRS seemed to portend that
it would soon allow all issuers—from the United States or
otherwise—to choose which standard to adhere to (a development

165. See id. at 332 (recommending “enhanced disclosure of those relationships” that “might
compromise the accountant’s independence”).
166. See id.
167. See id. at 336.
168. See id. at 335 (“[I]f all firms were required to rotate auditors every ten years . . . the
number of changes in any single year would be roughly double the number that occurred in 2003.
Such rotation can be expected to lead to much less concentration within industries.”).
169. James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-Year-Old
SEC, 95 VA. L. REV. 941, 941 (2009).
170. Id. at 943–44, 946–51.
171. Id. at 946.
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subsequently derailed by the 2008 financial crisis).172 In challenging
this, Cox returns to first principles and argues that there are “four wellrecognized interrelated objectives sought to be achieved by mandatory
disclosure requirements”173: to provide investors with sufficient
information to make informed, intelligent investment choices; to
enhance the allocational efficiency of securities markets; to reduce
fraudulent offerings and manipulation; and to “empower[]
stockholders vis-à-vis the firm’s managers and restrain[] opportunistic
behavior by company managers.”174 Given the weaknesses of the
IFRS—their lack of precision, their deference to management, and
their openness to political manipulation—only the first objective would
be satisfied under mutual recognition of both standards; the other three
would be harmed. Nor would investors be able to mitigate the risks of
fraudulent offerings through a properly diversified portfolio.175
Yet it does not seem possible to return to a world in which all
issuers touching U.S. markets are required to adhere to GAAP
because the forces of globalization are so powerful that “each country’s
securities regulations regime [cannot act as] an island unto itself.”176 In
the global marketplace, Cox counsels, the best approach is for the SEC
to engage with foreign regulators and authorities to raise standards
around the globe through “engagement, persuasion, and
perseverance,”177 developing capacities to evaluate proposed foreign
standards in the process. Neither isolationism nor heedless acceptance
of competing standards would serve the American investor.
B. Empirical Research Comes to the Fore in the Legal Academy
Cox’s scholarship over the past forty years displays remarkable
range, flexibility, and curiosity. Most recently, he has engaged with
what some see as the most exciting development in current corporate

172. Emily Chasan, SEC’s New Strategic Plan Backs Away from IFRS, WALL STREET J. (Feb.
4, 2014, 1:37 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2014/02/04/secs-new-strategic-plan-backs-away-fromifrs [https://perma.cc/FP5T-THHS].
173. Cox, supra note 169, at 959.
174. Id. at 961.
175. See id. at 969 (demonstrating that the risk of purchasing a fraudulent offering “is
systematic so that it cannot be diversified away; the larger and more diverse one’s portfolio, the
closer the portfolio’s overall risk . . . will be to the risk of fraud in the market as a whole”).
176. Id. at 983.
177. Id. at 985.
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legal scholarship: empirical legal studies.178 Cox (in conjunction with
one of the authors of this Article) has played a significant role in this
new scholarship, writing extensively about the empirical dimensions of
private and public enforcement of the federal securities laws and
showing the value of how lawyers analyze problems. His work in this
area shows a continued focus on the key role that shareholders play in
modern corporate governance, combining careful doctrinal and
theoretical analysis with the tools of modern econometrics to reinforce
his arguments.
1. Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence
and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to
Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements. In his widely cited
article Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence
and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to
Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements,179 Cox and one of the
authors of this Article document that many institutional investors,
perhaps as much as 70 percent, do not file claims to recover damages
that they are entitled to receive in settlements of securities class
actions.180 For those institutions that do file settlement claims, their
“average recovery rates are about one-third of losses” and the dollar
amounts of their mean and median recoveries are “substantial.”181
The reasons why these investors leave significant amounts of
money on the table are numerous. First, some institutional investors
accord a low priority to filing claims because they do business with
some of the settling companies and do not wish to ruffle their
feathers.182 Second, a lot of time passes between the commission of the
fraud, the filing of the suit, the final settlement, and the disbursement

178. See generally Randall S. Thomas, The Increasing Role of Empirical Research in Corporate
Law Scholarship, 92 GEO. L.J. 981 (2004) (defending an analytic approach to corporate law that
withstands rigorous testing while capturing the broad influences of politics and economics).
179. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers:
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in
Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411 (2005) [hereinafter Cox & Thomas,
Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers]. A pilot version of this study was published earlier.
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail
to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855 (2002).
180. Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers, supra note 179, at 425.
181. Id. at 424–25.
182. Id. at 425–29.
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of money.183 During that period, institutions may change advisors or
custodian banks and the claims and supporting documentation may get
lost.184 Third, institutions and advisors worry about their trading profits
a lot, and they fret about their returns from filing claims very little.
After all, they are evaluated on the trading profits, not the returns from
filing claims.185 Fourth, the company thinks that their custodian is filing
the claims while the custodian thinks the company is doing it, so neither
checks the other.186
These observations are supported by two surveys of institutional
investors about their practices.187 According to these surveys,
institutions largely rely on custodian banks to handle the filing of their
claims and hardly monitor the filing themselves.188 Custodians do not
charge separate fees for filing claims and therefore have little incentive
to do much work on them. Furthermore, the liability rules that apply
in this area for failing to file claims are weak: only abject failure to file
or monitor in the face of bad news is enough to establish liability for
institutional investors.189 Custodians can face contractual liability for
breaching any claim-filing obligation, but, again, institutions do not
actively monitor them.190
Having established the problem, Cox offers some policy
recommendations to deal with it. First, he proposes that the courts
establish a central clearinghouse for information about settlements and
claims.191 They should also standardize claim-filing documentation and

183. See id. at 429 (estimating that “four years or more can elapse between the date of a trade
that occurred during the front end of the class action period and the publication of notice of a
settlement”).
184. See id. (stating that “institutions and their advisors . . . change their custodian banks”
frequently, and that the “departing investment advisor or custodian bank does not customarily
forward to the institution, or its successors, the trading records for the portfolio it had previously
handled”).
185. Cf. id. at 431 (suggesting that institutional “managers who view their objective as being
well-performing traders” do “not value submitting claims because the expected gains of doing so”
are typically “dwarfed by both the size of the fund’s assets and the average yearly returns by the
fund”).
186. See id. at 432.
187. See id. at 432–38.
188. See id. at 445.
189. See id. at 441 (“[U]nless a fund was aware that its custodian was performing its claims
filing duties badly and the fund’s trustees consciously decided to do nothing about it, the current
practice would likely be sufficient to protect fund trustees from liability.”).
190. See id. at 442, 445.
191. Id. at 446.
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forms.192 Institutional investors need to monitor their custodians’
claim-filing practices. Finally, the SEC should improve institutional
investors’ 13F filing requirements and make this data more easily
available.193
More generally, Cox discusses the allocation rules that institutions
use for distributing proceeds that they collect.194 He shows that the
proceeds do not directly benefit the beneficiaries that lost money, but
rather they usually go into the institution’s general funds for the benefit
of all plan beneficiaries. This means that the losers from securities
fraud are not fully compensated for their losses. From a theoretical
perspective, these findings constitute an argument against justifying
securities class actions on the basis of compensation. Instead,
justifications should focus more on the class actions’ deterrence value.
This consideration reflects the earlier theme found in much of his work
on derivative suits: representative suits are best understood and
evaluated in terms of deterrence and not compensation.
2. Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead
Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions. The PSLRA195 was passed by the
U.S. Congress in 1995 and had a dramatic impact on private-securitiesfraud class actions.196 One of its most innovative provisions was the
lead-plaintiff provision,197 which created a rebuttable presumption that
the shareholder with the largest financial interest should be the named
plaintiff in securities fraud class actions.198 The theory was that large
institutional investors would have the best financial incentives to
monitor the plaintiffs’ attorneys who file these class actions. The hope
was that the institutional investors would negotiate lower fees,
supervise the filing of suits and litigation documents, and monitor class
counsel.
Institutional investors, however, were slow to answer the call to
arms. It turned out that becoming a lead plaintiff imposed significant

192. Id. at 445.
193. Id. at 446–48.
194. Id. at 449–53.
195. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
196. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical
Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1588 (2006).
197. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3), 78u-4(a)(3) (2012).
198. Cox & Thomas, supra note 196, at 1588–89.
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costs on institutions.199 These costs included discovery into the
institution’s business practices; the time needed to manage the
litigation, which was often uncompensated; the risk of disclosing
proprietary business information through discovery; and the threat of
suit by other plaintiffs who were disappointed at not being appointed
lead plaintiff.200 The institution would also face significant opportunity
costs as it was forced to give up the option of pursuing an individual
recovery.201
In the article Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of
Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, Cox and one of the authors
of this Article assess the impact of the lead-plaintiff provision, finding
that the presence of an institutional investor as the lead plaintiff leads
to a higher recovery for defrauded shareholders.202 The empirical
analysis also documents that courts prefer to select institutional
investors in the lead-plaintiff beauty contests. Lead plaintiffs choose
the biggest cases to seek appointment as lead plaintiffs, and the
percentage of losses recovered in securities class actions seemingly
declined after the passage of the PSLRA.203
Although most of these findings support Congress’s decision to
enact the lead-plaintiff provision, Cox sees room for improvement. He
suggests that courts should allow reimbursement of all the institutions’
expenses for being a lead plaintiff and ignore the statutory restrictions
on the number of cases in which a prominent institutional investors can
act as lead plaintiff.204
3. The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s
Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority. Cox’s embrace of economic
and empirical approaches does not signal an abandonment of more
traditional tools of legal analysis. In The Emperor Has No Clothes:
Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking
199. See id. at 1602–10 (discussing the costs of serving as lead plaintiff).
200. See id. at 1602.
201. Id. at 1604–05.
202. Id. at 1630–34. A related article is James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, There
Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action
Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355 (2008).
203. Id. at 1619–27, 1627 tbl.8.
204. Cox & Thomas, supra note 196, at 1637 (“[C]ourts should be more willing, indeed
activist, in awarding costs to institutional lead plaintiffs for all expenses related to an institution’s
participation as a lead plaintiff.”); id. at 1638 (“Furthermore, we believe courts generally should
follow the lead of the few judges that have been willing, in the right circumstances, to excuse the
‘professional plaintiff’ restrictions of the PSLRA.”).
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Authority, Cox and Professor Benjamin Baucom analyze205 the D.C.
Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC,206 which invalidated
the SEC’s recently adopted Rule 14a-11.207 This rule provided certain
shareholders access to a corporation’s proxy so that they could
nominate their own candidates for director positions.208 In this article,
Cox and Baucom challenge both the decision that struck down the rule
and the court’s new approach to regulations that promised to strangle
much SEC rulemaking.
In Business Roundtable, the court insisted that the SEC was
required to apply a cost-benefit analysis to justify the proposed
regulation.209 Here, Cox and Baucom closely examine the relevant
legislative history before concluding that the court applied a level of
judicial review inconsistent with what Congress had mandated in the
securities acts.210 They then offer a new approach to justify the
adoption of regulations that would allow future SEC rulemaking to
better fit the more exacting scrutiny that new rules will seemingly have
to survive.
According to Cox and Baucom, the main flaw in the D.C. Circuit’s
analysis is its conclusion that the SEC, in adopting Rule 14a-11, was
required to produce “an accurate cost-benefit determination” and
failed to do so.211 For most of its history, the SEC merely had to
determine whether a rule was “in the public interest” and would
further “the protection of investors.”212 In 1996, however, the National
Market Securities Improvement Act (NMSIA)213 added a requirement

205. James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the
D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811 (2012).
206. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
207. Id. at 1156.
208. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,677 (Sept. 16,
2010) (amending 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249), invalidated by Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647
F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
209. See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148–49 (holding that the SEC’s “failure to ‘apprise
itself . . . of the economic consequences of a proposed regulation’ makes promulgation of the rule
arbitrary and capricious” (citing Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir.
2005))).
210. Cox & Baucom, supra note 205, at 1818–21 (concluding that the “triple considerations of
efficiency, competition, and capital formation” in the statute are subordinate to the SEC’s
primary goal of investor protection (citing the review standard set out in Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012))).
211. Id. at 1813.
212. Id. at 1818 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b)).
213. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat.
3416 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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that the SEC also consider whether a proposed rule “promote[s]
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”214 The legislative
history of the NMSIA shows, though, that Congress did not intend to
require a rule always be found to promote “efficiency, competition,
and capital formation,” nor did Congress intend to mandate costbenefit analysis for every rule.215 Legislative history did, to be sure,
suggest that “rigorous analysis”216 would be demanded when weighing
a proposed rule, but this suggestion did not mean that each rule had to
advance “efficiency, competition, or capital formation.”217 Nor did
there exist any requirement that a rule yield a quantifiable net benefit.
In sum, the new language in the NSMIA was not intended to change
the criteria by which courts should weigh SEC rulemaking. This fact is
shown all the more through Congress’s addition of a mandate that
requires the U.S. Commodities Future Trading Commission to
consider a rule’s costs and benefits in other legislation.218
So Business Roundtable, Cox and Baucom conclude, is simply
wrong when it says the SEC has to determine that a rule yields a “net
benefit” or promotes efficiency, competition, and capital formation.219
Courts may have to consider these three factors, but not every rule
must promote them.220 It is also possible, they note, that the SEC shot
itself in the foot by specifically finding that Rule 14a-11 would enhance
“efficiency, competition, and capital formation” even though it was not
necessary.221
Cox and Baucom recommend that, going forward, the SEC
reenact the rule so that it and future rules meet the review standard
and satisfy the language of the statute. They recommend taking three
specific steps. First, the SEC should stop “concluding” that a proposed
rule promotes all of the abovementioned factors: if the statute only
requires that the SEC “consider” the rule’s impact on the factors, then

214. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b).
215. Cox & Baucom, supra note 205, at 1820 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 39 (1996)
(emphasis added)).
216. Id. (emphasis omitted).
217. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b).
218. 7 U.S.C. § 19(a); see Cox & Baucom, supra note 205, at 1823.
219. Cox & Baucom, supra note 205, at 1822.
220. See id. at 1837 (maintaining that Congress only mandated that the SEC “consider”—not
“find” or “ensure”—that a proposed rule satisfies the triple aims of efficiency, competition, and
capital formation).
221. See id. at 1840 (suggesting that the “SEC appears to have blindly walked into a trap it
has set for itself . . . find[ing] itself hoisted by its own petard”).
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that is all it should do.222 Second, it should defend its conclusions
rigorously but not in the language of econometrics. A strong qualitative
case can be made for rules whose benefits are impossible to precisely
quantify. It may also be better if the SEC promulgated its rule in a
different way. It should, Cox and Baucom propose, consider “staging”
such regulatory changes to allow for a “natural experiment” on a rule,
creating data about the rule’s impact and success before its widespread
adoption.223 Third, because the burdens imposed by “one size fits all”
regulations can be disproportionately great for smaller companies, the
SEC should consider scaling regulation so that smaller issuers would
initially enjoy less-stringent regulation until a rule’s impact could be
measured.224
CONCLUSION
Over the past forty years, corporate law scholarship has moved
through a series of stages, from wrestling with the traditional problems
Berle and Means set out, to the attack on accepted verities launched
by the contractarians, to a theoretical stalemate offset by new
developments that led to the application of empirical methods.
Through all these shifts, Jim Cox has produced an enviable body of
scholarship and has provided a model for what a corporate law scholar
can accomplish. He has fought tenaciously to defend shareholders
when he believed they were threatened by new developments. He has
kept his roots in traditional scholarship, yet has judiciously applied the
latest tools and developments when warranted. Through his labors, he
has moved the needle in corporate law scholarship away from
contractarianism and toward a more open-ended paradigm. For those
of us who are his contemporaries, we can only wish that we have as
great an impact on the field as he has had.

222. Id.
223. Id. at 1843.
224. Id. at 1845–46.

